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TRIAL PRAcTicE-BILL OF ExcsErTIoNs SIGNED BY JUDGE NOT TRYING THE
CAUSE-PRESUMPTION OF REGULARITY-[Missouri].-In Gnekow v. Metro-
politan Insurance Co., the judge who signed the bill of exceptions was not
the same judge who had tried the cause. The St. Louis Court of Appeals,
indulging the presumption of regularity in trial proceedings, held that the
bill of exceptions was authentic, in the absence of direct proof that the
judge who had signed it was unauthorized by statute to so act.
At common law it was necessary that the judge who tried the cause be
the one to sign the bill of exceptions, 2 for signing and sealing gave the
appellate court jurisdiction to review all matters outside the record proper.3
By statute,4 in Missouri, the common law has been changed in those in-
stances where the judge who tried the case goes out of office before the
signing of the bill of exceptions. 5 The Gnekow decision and the Missouri
statute, therefore, are in accord with the present tendency to liberalize
proceedings for an appeal.0
A comparison of the cases in neighboring states upon this problem shows
a great variety of results. In Arkansas a statuteT has modified the common-
law rule by providing that where the judge who presided at the trial dies,
becomes insane, or for any other cause becomes incapacitated before he has
signed the exceptions, his successor in office shall allow, or correct, and sign
the exceptions. In O'Neal v. State,8 therefore, it was held that when a
judge goes out of office, he still retains authority to sign bills of exceptions
arising out of cases which he had tried prior to the expiration of his term.
Kentucky, which adheres strictly to the common law on this point, holds
as a settled rule that a judge who had not presided at the trial has no
power to sign the bill of exceptions.9 Furthermore, the judge who had pre-
sided at the cause has no authority to sign the bill of exceptions after the
cessation of his term of office.' 0 In Oklahoma, the statutory substitute for
the bill of exceptions is the so-called case-made. In that state, provision is
1. (Mo. App. 1937) 108 S. W. (2d) 621.
2. 2 Tidd, Practice (Am. notes 1856) 863 (note A); Law v. Jackson
(1827) 8 Cow. (N. Y.) 746; Kruse v. People (1899) 84 Ill. App. 620.
3. Modern Woodmen of America v. Blair (1931) 263 Ill. App. 387.
4. R. S. Mo. (1929) sec. 1012, provides: In any case where the judge
who heard the cause shall go out of office before signing the bill of excep-
tions, such bill, if agreed to be true by the parties to the action, or their
attorneys, or shown to the judge to be correct, shall be signed by the suc-
ceeding or acting judge of the court where the case was heard."
5. In accord with the liberal tendency evidenced in the Gnekow case is
Fenn v. Reber (1910) 153 Mo. App. 219, 132 S. W. 627, where it was held
that a bill of exceptions, signed by a judge succeeding the judge who tried
the cause in a certain division of the circuit, was signed correctly by the
succeeding judge as the statutory phrase, "going out of office," was ap-
plicable to a change of division.
6. Yancey v. Patterson (1903) 97 Mo. App. 681, 71 S. W. 845; Lambert
v. Lambert (Mo. App. 1919) 208 S. W. 118.
7. Ark. Pope's Digest (1937) sec. 1546.
8. (1911) 98 Ark. 449, 136 S. W. 936.
9. Combs v. Combs (1917) 175 Ky. 523, 194 S. W. 790.
10. Ibid.
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made by statute for the case-made to be signed, settled, and certified by the
judge trying the case, even though he is out of office.:"
Kansas and Illinois have adopted the most efficient and liberal views in
the matter of review on appeal by providing for an automatic transfer of
the entire record. The Kansas court in interpreting its statute held that
exceptions to rulings were abolished by the legislature by striking from the
code all provisions relating to exceptions. 12 Illinois, prior to 1933, was
strict in requiring the judge who signed the bill of exceptions to be the
same judge who tried the cause.13 But with the passage of the new Illinois
Practice Act,' 4 the entire record, similar to the record in equity, will be
brought up for review, and the only authentication requirements are pre-
scribed by the appellate courts, as they deem advisable.
The instant case seems to be a trend in the right direction. It is sub-
mitted, however, that Kansas and Illinois have adopted a more direct and
desirable method of treating this problem.
I. B.
UNFAIR COMPETITION-RIGHT TO PRIVACY-PERFORMER'S INTEREST IN HIS
RECORDED PERFORMANCE-INUNCTION-[Pennsylvania].-Has a musician
such a common law property interest in his recorded interpretations of a
composition' as to afford him equitable relief from the unauthorized broad-
casting of such recordings by a radio station as part of its sustaining pro-
gram?2 In a recent case' the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held that the
11. Old. Comp. Stats. (1921) sec. 787. This is a statutory modification of
the common law, similar to the Missouri and Arkansas statutes, supra. The
Oklahoma statute modified the rule laid down in Mitchell v. Bruce (1922)
80 Old. 53, 204 Pac. 281, and affirmed in 1927 in Ark. Fertilizer Company
v. Brattin, 127 Old. 9,260 Pac. 43, that a case-made signed and settled by
the successor of the judge who tried the cause, in the absence of a show-
ing of inability of the trial judge to sign is a nulity. This view would be
contra to the Missouri presumption of regularity in trial court proceedings.
12. Cobe v. Coughlin Hardware Co. (1910) 83 Kan. 522, 112 Pac. 115.
To the same effect see Bowen v. Timmer (1912) 87 Kan. 162, 123 Pac. 742;
Baker v. Readicker (1911) 84 Kan. 489, 115 Pac. 112; Readicker v. Denning
(1912) 86 Kan. 79, 119 Pac. 533.
13. Independent Electric Company v. Donald (1899) 86 Ill. App. 166; but
see Corbly v. Corbly 202 Il1. App. 469.
14. Illinois, McKaskill's Practice Act (1936 Supp.) sec. 74 (2).
1. Copyright Act (1909 as amended 1912) 35 Stat. 1076, 17 U. S. C. A.
sec. 5. Subjects of copyright listed; right of performer in his performance
not included.
2. Plaintiff made recordings for the Victor Talking Machine Co., agree-
ing at the time that the legend "not licensed for radio broadcasting" be
put on the face of each record. Defendant secured license from the Ameri-
can Society of Composers, Authors, and Publishers, to whom both composer
and publisher had assigned their rights, and played the record on one of
its programs, announcing it as a Fred Waring recording. Plaintiff seeks
an injunction.
3. Fred Waring v. WDAS Broadcasting Station, Inc. (Pa. 1937) 194
Atl. 631.
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